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I. Introduction 
The evolution of hydrologic fracturing has revolutionized America’s 
economy on a global scale.
1 
Over the past 15 years, technology has made it 
possible to extract billions of barrels and oil and gas from geologic 
formations “once thought to be out of reach.”
2
However, with new methods 
come new demands; technology provides the ways, water provides the 
means.
3
Water provides not only the vehicle for bringing up the fractured 
minerals extracted from the formation, it allows for the efficient processing 
of hydrocarbons after exiting the well.
4
 To achieve energy independence 




                                                                                                             
 1. See Kondash, Andrew, and Avner Vengosh. Water footprint of hydrologic 
fracturing, Environmental Science & Technology Letters 2, no. 10 (2015): 276-280 
(describing the demand of relative volume of hydrologic fracturing in the context of 
comparable industries). 
 2. Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the Context of 
Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21 (State Bar of 
Texas, Fall 2017). 
 3. See Clark, Corrie E., Robert M. Horner, and Christopher B. Harto. Life cycle water 
consumption for shale gas and conventional natural gas. Environmental science & 
technology 47, no. 20 (2013): 11829-11836 (detailing the use of water throughout the 
hydrologic fracturing process). 
 4. See López-Díaz, D.C., Lira-Barragán, L.F., Rubio-Castro, E., You, F. and Ponce-
Ortega, J.M., 2018. Optimal design of water networks for shale gas hydrologic fracturing 
including economic and environmental criteria. Clean Technologies and Environmental 
Policy, 20 (10), pp. 2311- 2332 (describing the reason why fracing requires fresh water).  
 5. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy, 
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and 
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of 
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p.5, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3 
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZG7C-3PGQ] (focusing on the statistics of oil and gas production in the major formations in 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss3/8
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Depending on the geologic formation, millions of gallons of water per 
well utilizing the hydrologic fracturing method are required to maintain 
steady operations.
6
 Fracing operations in the Eagle Ford Basin could use 
between an estimated 943 million barrels (a barrel equal 42 gallons of 
water) to as much as 5.3 billion barrels of water per year, depending on the 
rate of productivity.
7 
Similarly, fracing operators in the Permian Basin 
could reach 8.8 billion barrels of water per year by 2030.
8 
This amount of 
water demand is equivalent to the yearly demand of the state of New 
Jersey.
9 
It is estimated the United States demand for water in the use of 
hydrologic fracing will grow exponentially as technology finds new 
untapped formations.
10
 Technology will provide new ways to extract 
minerals from the earth while conserving this valuable commodity, water.
 
As with any earthly mineral, fresh water is not unlimited. While concerns 
have been increasing with regard to the use of virgin water during fracing 
operations, especially during drought conditions, operators have been able 
to efficiently extract precise amounts of groundwater according to each 
                                                                                                             
Texas); Kondash, Andrew, and Avner Vengosh. Water footprint of hydrologic fracturing. 
Environmental Science & Technology Letters 2, no. 10 (2015): 276-280. (explaining the use 
of water during hydrologic fracturing requires massive quantities). 
 6. See Kondash, Andrew, and Avner Vengosh. Water footprint of hydrologic 
fracturing. Environmental Science & Technology Letters 2, no. 10 (2015): 276-280. 
(quantifying the number of gallons of water required to maintain a producing well). 
 7. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy, 
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and 
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of 
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p.5, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3 
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZG7C-3PGQ] (focusing on the statistics of oil and gas production in the major formations in 
Texas). 
 8. Id.  
 9. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, U.S. Geological Surv., Cheryl A. Dieter, Molly A. 
Maupin, Rodney R. Caldwell, Melissa A. Harris, Tamara I. Ivahnenko, John K. Lovelace, 
Nancy L. Barber & Kristin S. Linsey, Estimated Use of Water in the United States in 2015, 
Circular 1441, 9 (June 19, 2018), https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/cir1441 
[https://perma.cc/272A-PGX7] (quantifying the use of the fresh water needs of the state of 
New Jersey in order to compare it to the demand for fresh water usage in fracing operations). 
 10. See Jean-Philippe Nicot, Anna K. Hebel, Stephanie M. Ritter, Steven Walden1, 
Russ Baier1, Peter Galusky, James Beach, Richard Kyle, Leigh Symank & Cari Breton, Tex. 
Water Dev. Bd., Current and Projected Water Use in the Texas Mining and Oil and Gas 
Industry, 205 (June 2011), http://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/reports/contracted_ 
reports/doc/0904830939_MiningWaterUse.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2GP-2F6X] (utilizing a 
holistic view of future water use projected in Texas fracing operations). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021





Anticipating the growing need for freshwater, operators of 
fracing wells have developed recycling techniques to purify flowback water 
able to be utilized again.
12 
On average, operators have developed a way to 
recycle up to 40% of the original water used in fracing operations so that it 
could be used again—without the need to use additional virgin freshwater.
13  
Such virgin groundwater is distinguished from water produced from oil 
bearing formation, which formation water is not covered in this comment. 
However, much of the recycled water product was not used again for 
fracing, but sold by operators for other industry needs or used on other 
tracts of land; by selling this recycled water or by using on other tracts of 
land, operators have created an economy that not only reduces their 
operating costs, but can also be said to limit the environmental impact.
14 
                                                                                                             
 11. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy, 
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and 
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of 
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p.5, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3 
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZG7C-3PGQ] (describing how operators have become very efficient at using exact fresh 
water quantities). 
 12. See Water Conservation & Technology Center, Fact Sheet Planning Component 8: 
The Eagle Ford Hydrologic Fracturing Water Planning Services, Texas A&M Univ. (Jan. 
2013) (on file with author) (describing the water purification systems utilized in fracing 
operations); see also Shale and Tight Resources, https://www.chevron.com/operations/shale 
[https://perma.cc/H9Z7-CNFX] (last visited Dec. 29, 2019) (describing how a large producer 
has taken advantage of water recycling technology in the fracing industry). 
 13. See generally Gabriel Collins, Frac Ranching vs. Cattle Ranching: Exploring the 
Economic Motivations Behind Operator-Surface Owner Conflicts over Produced Water 
Recycling Projects, Issue Brief, Baker Inst. for Public Pol’y, Rice University (Oct. 17, 2017) 
(quantifying the amount of recycled water operators can use again or sell); Jason 
Schumacher and Jennifer Morrissey, The Legal Landscape of "Fracing": The Oil and Gas 
Industry's Game-Changing Technique Is Its Biggest Hurdle, 17 Tex. Rev. Law & Pol. 239 
(Spring 2013) (describing the amount of flowback water generally produced in one well 
when hydrologic fracing). 
 14. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the 
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21 
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (describing how the Operators have created a market for 
waste water that would have otherwise been permanently lost through traditional disposal 
methods). See also, Gabriel Collins, Frac Ranching vs. Cattle Ranching: Exploring the 
Economic Motivations Behind Operator- Surface Owner Conflicts over Produced Water 
Recycling Projects, Issue Brief, Baker Inst. for Public Pol’y, Rice University (Oct. 17, 2017) 
(describing the value of water owned by surface owners in a number of different industrial 
uses); 2019 Sustainability Report, Sustainable Development Program, Pioneer Natural
Resources, http://www.pxd.com/sites/default/files/reports/2019-Sustainability-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2MQW-2WKV] (outlining the way a major operator will “Increasing the 
use of recycled produced water in hydrologic fracturing”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss3/8
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With the price of recycled water selling from ten to seventy-five cents per 
barrel, it is estimated operators can make over one million dollars per well 
per production cycle.
15 
From the perspective of the operator, recycling 
fracing water is a matter of economics.  
The expansion of hydrologic fracing has made Texas not only the 
industry leader, but the legislative vanguard of oil and gas exploration and 
extraction.
16 
Over and over again, it is to Texas to which other states mirror 
their fracing regulations.
17 
The Texas Railroad Commission (“RRC”) has 
been steady in its regulation of the oil and gas industry in Texas—balancing 
the needs of both the surface and mineral estate—while maintaining 
mineral exploration and exploitation essential to Texas’s economy.
18 
With 
the “hydrologic fracturing revolution” the Texas Legislature in 2013 and 
2019, has tried to be proactive in maintaining the integrity of the oil and gas 
industry in relation to surface and mineral estate owners.
19 
Changes to the 
                                                                                                             
 15. See Gabriel Collins, Frac Ranching vs. Cattle Ranching: Exploring the Economic 
Motivations Behind Operator-Surface Owner Conflicts over Produced Water Recycling 
Projects, Issue Brief, Baker Inst. for Public Pol’y, Rice University (Oct. 17, 2017) 
(comparing how the value of water sold to hydrologic fracturing producers can be more 
lucrative than traditional cattle farming).  
 16. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy, 
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and 
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of 
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p. 19, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3 
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZG7C-3PGQ] (“per barrel water acquisitions costs in seven Permian Basin counties with 
averages ranging from a low of $.48 per barrel in Howard Country to as high as $1.02 per 
barrel in Eddy County”); see also Mark Kaufman, We're fracing the hell out of the U.S.A. 
Can a president slam on the brakes?, Yahoo! News (June 26, 2019), https://news.yahoo.com/ 
were-fracing-hell-u-president-165440714.html [https://perma.cc/3E6T-2J3N] (focusing on 
the expansion and future of fracing in Texas and the legislation surrounding its regulation). 
 17. See generally Marathon Oil led an initiative to remove barriers to using produced 
water in New Mexico, https://www.marathonoil.com/Sustainability-Report/Highlights/ 
Water-Management/ [https://perma.cc/NKG8-KRAL] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) 
(describing the way a major producer and operator will look to the New Mexico Legislature 
to change the law in the same way they lobbied the Texas Legislature). 
 18. See generally Railroad Commission of Texas, Oil & Gas Exploration and Surface 
Ownership, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/resource-center/faqs/oil-gas-exploration-
and-surface- ownership/ [https://perma.cc/689E-8A7Y] (last updated July 18, 2016) 
(providing context to how the agency for regulatory oversight interacts with operators and 
surface owners within the context of oil and gas exploration). 
 19. See Act of May 28, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 201, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 209 
(amended 2015 and 2019) (current version at Tex. Nat. Res. Code Chapter 122.002) 
(understanding the evolution of fracing technology, the Texas Legislature has amended this 
code three times in the past 6 years); see also Yes, No, Maybe So: Uncertainty in Texas 
Groundwater Withdrawal for Hydrologic Fracturing, 52 Hous. L. Rev. 1227, 1236 (2015) 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
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Natural Resource Code Chapter 122 have tried to keep up with the general 
practices of the evolution of fracing technology.
20 
In 2013, the Texas 
Legislature would first address the treatment of post fracing waste.
21 
However, changing the law to favor the operators at the expense of the 
surface owners during fracing operations—in an industry where the 
production of value is hundreds of millions of dollars per day—had the 
potential to produce unanticipated consequences.
22
 
Water treatment technology is not a stranger in the energy sector; nor is 
the practice of recycling industrial waste. Therefore, it is essential to limit 
the scope and properly define the terms within this comment. The principles 
of law and conclusions throughout this comment are specific to 
“groundwater entirely produced by the surface estate (and the lands pooled 
therewith) subject to mineral production on a tract therein.”
23 
This comment 
will exclusively focus on what is commonly referred to as a severed estate 
subject to no prior contracts or surface use agreements. As used throughout 
this comment “surface owner” or “surface estate” means all interests in the 
fee simple estate (whether severed or not), except the mineral estate granted 
to or reserved by the mineral interest owner (i.e., the fee simple title save 
                                                                                                             
(“The Texas legislature made numerous unsuccessful attempts to address this ambiguity”); 
Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Executive Summary: Sustainable Produced 
Water Policy, Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 
2019 and Beyond, (Sept. 16, 2019), https://texasalliance.org/white-paper/ 
[https://perma.cc/944V-MA4D] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (“Texas took an early lead in 
recognizing the potential value of recycling and began updating its regulatory framework in 
2013”). 
 20. See Act of May 28, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 201, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 209 
(amended 2015 and 2019) (current version at Tex. Nat. Res. Code Chapter 122.002) 
(understanding the evolution of fracing technology, the Texas Legislature has amended this 
code three times in the past 6 years). 
 21. See generally Act of May 28, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 201, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. 
Laws 209 (amended 2015 and 2019) (current version at Tex. Nat. Res. Code Chapter 
122.002) (understanding the evolution of fracing technology, the Texas Legislature has 
amended this code three times in the past 6 years). 
 22. See generally Andrew R. Thomas, Fracing Keeps the Gas Pedal on U.S. Economy, 
Industry Week (March 26, 2019) (explaining the impact of the United States fracing industry 
on the global economy); Permian Basin Petroleum Association, Economic Impact of Oil and 
Gas Industry in Texas, https://pbpa.info/industry-statistics [https://perma.cc/GE3S-G4HA] 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (“[t]he oil and gas industry paid over $15.7 billion in Texas state 
and local taxes and royalties in fiscal 2014 and a total $98.9 billion in Texas state and local 
taxes and royalties from 2007 through 2015”). 
 23. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the 
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21 
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (matching terminology with language used in the practice of 
oil and gas law). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss3/8
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the title to the minerals in place); “mineral estate” means those interests 
held by the mineral interest owner.
24 
“Operator” means the companies 
exploring and exploiting the minerals through hydrologic fracturing. This 
comment does not cover ground water which has been sold by the surface 
owner to the operator. 
There are many stakeholders in the economy of hydrologic fracturing.
25 
For example, Regulatory agencies, environmental agencies, state and local 
governments, and independent business operators all have a part to play at 
any one stage of the fracing process.
26
 However, even though this comment 
does not intend to delve into the interests of the above-mentioned 
stakeholders—by focusing on the surface and mineral estates—the 
consequences will reverberate amongst these stakeholders. The regulation 
of finite minerals will increasingly become more important. 
This comment will focus on House Bill 3246 and its impact in the 
context of surface and operator conflicts; specifically, the common practice 
of operators recycling post-fracing wastewater. Further, this comment will 
assert the enforcement of the provisions in House Bill 3246 as outlined in 
the Texas Natural Resources Code Chapter 122.002 constitutes a 
constitutional regulatory taking of the water, being an attribute of the 
surface estate, when operators use recycled water to service acreage other 
than the producing tract of land, or acreage pooled within. Part II of the 
comment will explain the division of rights existing between the surface 
estate owner and the mineral estate owner. Part III will describe the 
legislative history of House Bill 3246 and the interest of the Legislature in 
revising the Texas Natural Resources Code. Part IV will analyze the effect 
of House Bill 3246 on surface owners and conclude that as applied, Texas 
Natural Resources Code Chapter 122.002 is a regulatory taking. Part V will 
conclude and provide context into this unique area of the law. The real 
                                                                                                             
 24. Id.  
 25. See Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law Conference, 
Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities and Potential 
Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the number of parties involved 
in dealing with post fracing waste in the context of operators and third parties). 
 26. See generally Railroad Commission of Texas, Water Use in Association with Oil 
and Gas Activities, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/resource-center/faqs/oil-gas-
faqs/faq-water-use- in-association-with-oil-and-gas-activities/ [https://perma.cc/Z5UK-
NDEB] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (providing context to how the agency for regulatory 
oversight interacts with other agencies within the context of oil and gas exploration); Peter 
E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the Context of Water 
Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21 (State Bar of 
Texas, Fall 2017) (describing the enforcement and regulatory power in the context of water 
treatment and usage). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
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property doctrine of correlative rights creates a usufruct interest in the 
groundwater allowing the operator to use the water to exploit the minerals 
for benefit of the land or acreage pooled therewith. The statute then 
attempts to expand the usufruct right of use into an ownership interest in the 
backflow water. 
II. Division of Rights 
Texas gives a fee simple owner proprietary rights and constitutional 
protections to every molecule or atom located underground within the 
property boundary.
27 
The mineral interest owner will have the dominant 
interest over the surface estate.
28
 It is important to establish what rights and 
substances are reserved when the minerals are severed. Traditionally, the 
hydrocarbons in place are owned by the mineral estate while groundwater is 
part of the surface estate.
29 
Moreover, this severability is always subject to 
the terms of the conveying instrument or contract.
30
  
                                                                                                             
 27. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831–32 (Tex. 2012) (quoting 
“[I]n our state the landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and 
gas in place beneath his land. The only qualification of that rule of ownership is that it must 
be considered in connection with the law of capture and is subject to police regulations. The 
oil and gas beneath the soil are considered a part of the realty. Each owner of land owns 
separately, distinctly and exclusively all the oil and gas under his land and is accorded the 
usual remedies against trespassers who appropriate the minerals or destroy their market 
value.”); see also Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. 1948) (quoting 
“[E]ach owner whose land overlies the basin has a like interest, and each must of necessity 
exercise his right with some regard to the rights of others”). 
 28. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972) (“[T]he oil and gas 
lessee’s estate is the dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an express 
provision for payment of free use of such part and so much of the premises as is reasonably 
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regard for the rights of the 
owner of the surface estate.”); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971) 
(quoting “[I]t is well settled that the oil and gas estate is the dominant estate in the sense that 
use of as much of the premises as is reasonably necessary to produce and remove the 
minerals is held to be impliedly authorized by the lease; but that the rights implied in favor 
of the mineral estate are to be exercised with due regard for the rights of the owner of the 
servient estate.”); Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1961) (citing “[W]e agree 
that the owner-operator of the lease has the right to use so much of the land, both surface and 
subsurface, as is reasonably necessary to comply with the terms of the lease contract and to 
carry out the purposes and intentions of the parties.”); TDC Engineering, Inc. v. Dunlap, 686 
S.W.2d 346,349 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding the mineral estate is the "dominant estate"). 
 29. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1972) (quoting “[W]ater, 
unsevered expressly by conveyance or reservation, has been held to be a part of the surface 
estate.”); See also Fleming Found. v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1960) (holding “[t]he reservation of oil, gas and other minerals does not include the sub-
surface water.”); City of Del Rio v. Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Tr., 269 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss3/8
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Texas jurisprudence and regulatory governance dictates a balance 
between correlative rights and the rule of capture.
31 
The delicate dance 
created by correlative rights in the use of groundwater have limited the 
outright exploitation of hydrocarbons at the expense of the surface estate in 
four major ways: the accommodation doctrine
32
, the reasonable and non-
negligent use of the surface
33
, usufructuary water rights
34
, and beneficial 
surface use for the mineral estate.
35 
These well-established doctrines work 
together to ensure balance between the rights of the surface owner and 
mineral owner, when interests may not always align.
36 
Because the mineral 
estate is dominant, the accommodation doctrine tempers these implied 
rights by stating the mineral interest owner must, if reasonably able to do 
so, give due regard to the surface owner’s existing current use of the 
surface.
37
 Along these same lines, the mineral owner must use its implied 
                                                                                                             
Ct. App. 2008) (quoting “[U]nder the rule of capture a person owns all of the [water or] oil 
and gas produced by a well bottomed on his own land, even though the well may be draining 
the substances from beneath other property”). 
 30. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1972) (“[W]ater, 
unsevered expressly by conveyance or reservation, has been held to be a part of the surface 
estate.”). 
 31. See 2 Ernest E. Smith and Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.3 
(LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2015) (“the Railroad Commission’s duty to protect correlative 
rights exists side by side with the common-law rule of capture.”). 
 32. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808,810 (Tex. 1972) (“The oil and gas 
lessee’s estate is the dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an express 
provision for payment, of free use of such part and so much of the premises as is reasonably 
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regard for the rights of the 
owner of the surface estate.”) (emphasis added). 
 33. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972) (Quoting “[T]he oil 
and gas lessee’s estate is the dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an 
express provision for payment, of free use of such part and so much of the premises as is 
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regard for the rights 
of the owner of the surface estate.”) (emphasis added). 
 34. See Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. 1973) 
(explaining the use of the implied right by the dominant estate does not extend to an 
ownership interest in the property used); In re Adjudication of Water Rights of Upper 
Guadalupe Segment etc., 642 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. 1982) (“[a] usufruct has been defined 
as the right to use, enjoy and receive the profits of property that belongs to another”). 
 35. See 501 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. 1973) (explaining the use of the implied right by the 
dominant estate must not be for the benefit outside that of the surface estate boundaries). 
 36. See 2 Ernest E. Smith and Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.3 
(LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2015) (“Because Texas conservation statutes never define 
correlative rights, the courts have filled the void.”). 
 37. See generally Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Tex. 1971) (establishing 
the mineral interest owner must take into account reasonable alternatives when operating 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
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right of the surface in a reasonable and non-negligent manner.
38 
The last 




A. Use Versus Ownership 
Use is not ownership. Correlative rights of the severed mineral interest 
owner are expressly usufructuary.
40 
The Texas Supreme Court utilizes the 
present right to use only when conceptualizing the implied surface use right 
by the dominant estate.
41
 In both the Sun Oil and Robinson v. Robbins 
Petroleum Corp. opinions, the court takes pains to describe these rights in 
terms of “use” and not of ownership.
42 
In Sun Oil, the court reiterates “the 
implied grant of reasonable use extends to and includes the right to use 
water from the leased premises in such amount as may be reasonably 
necessary to carry out the lessee’s operations under the lease.”
43
    
Robbins Petroleum Corp. would not only further usufructuary nature of 
the implied right to use, but would state “the water itself is an incident of 
surface ownership in the absence of specific conveyancing language to the 
contrary.”
44 
It is in this concept that the dominant estate is dominant, 
                                                                                                             
under the implied right of use; further, the mineral estate must do so in a non-negligent 
manner). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock, 498 S.W.3d 53, 64 (Tex. 2016) 
(“Common law rules governing mineral and groundwater estates are not merely similar; they 
are drawn from each other or from the same source”). 
 40. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the 
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21 
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (“Since a mineral interest owner’s right to water is 
usufructuary—giving it a present right of use only—it cannot sell that which it does not 
own.”) (emphasis in original). 
 41. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the 
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21 
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (“In each instance, the court’s recognition of a mineral 
interest owner’s implied right of surface use implicitly recognizes the surface estate owner’s 
ownership of the surface. Second, the court’s language confines surface use to effectuating 
the purposes of the mineral lease”). 
 42. See generally Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972) (describing the 
rights of the mineral interest owner in terms of use); Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 
501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. 1973) (explaining use of the surface estate and not ownership of 
the property used). 
 43. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1972) (adding the qualification 
of reasonable use of the surface estate by the operator). 
 44. Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. 1973) 
(qualifying the usufruct can be modified by any legal contractual agreement).  
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without this usufruct, mineral interest owners would have no way to extract 
minerals without an agreement with the surface owner.  
The reiteration of use over ownership is not inconsequential, it is 
essential to how Texas law balances the interests of a severed estate. Also 
important, are the ancillary and regulatory interactions between the state 
and the oil and gas industry. This comment seeks to provide background 
into how the oil and gas industry has been regulated previously to provide 
context to the impact of House Bill 3246. To understand how operators 
must interact with statutory and regulatory obligations, every stage of the 
fracing process must be understood in terms of the legislative purview. 
B. The Legal Relation of Water to Its Practical Use 
There is no question that groundwater is an attribute of the surface 
estate.
45 
The mineral estate is the dominant estate.
46 
Because of the 
dominant estate status, Texas allows capture of those minerals through 
reasonable use of the surface estate. Operators looking to exploit minerals 
may in a practical sense, use the surface to effectuate their exploitation.
47 
The means by which operators effectuate the use of the surface estate 
during the process of hydrologic fracturing is a multi-tiered approach—




                                                                                                             
 45. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831-32 (Tex. 2012) (holding 
“In our state the landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas 
in place beneath his land. The only qualification of that rule of ownership is that it must be 
considered in connection with the law of capture and is subject to police regulations. The oil 
and gas beneath the soil are considered a part of the realty. Each owner of land owns 
separately, distinctly and exclusively all the oil and gas under his land and is accorded the 
usual remedies against trespassers who appropriate the minerals or destroy their market 
value.”). 
 46. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1972) (“The oil and gas lessee’s 
estate is the dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an express provision 
for payment, of free use of such part and so much of the premises as is reasonably necessary 
to effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regard for the rights of the owner of the 
surface estate.”) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 47. See TDC Engineering, Inc. v. Dunlap, 686 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. App.—Eastland 
1985) (“A grant of minerals would be worthless to a grantee if he could not enter upon the 
land for exploration and extraction of the minerals granted.” (quoting Ball v. Dillard, 602 
S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980))). 
 48. Frac Focus Chemical Disclosure Registry, Hydrologic Fracturing: The Process, 
https://fracfocus.org/hydrologic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydrologic-fracturing-process 
[https://perma.cc/DW5V-QUDX] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (describing the four-stage 
process requiring freshwater). 
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1. From Groundwater to Well-Head 
Once operators begin the process of drilling and fracing, one of the first 
steps is to acquire significant amounts of fresh water, usually by way of 
freshwater wells drilled on the surface estate.
49 
The water extracted by the 
operator is then pumped to storage tanks or large ponds closer to the well 
head.
50 
These fresh water storage ponds are usually filled days prior to the 
beginning of injecting the water into the well.
51 
The operator is very 
cautious not to lose or contaminate any freshwater during this early stage by 
ensuring proper transportation of the freshwater through pipes or by trucks 
and properly casing the wellbore.
52 
Throughout this process, involving 
significant and expensive infrastructure, the legal ownership of the water 
has not changed.
53 
Legal ownership has not changed under common law, 
Texas jurisprudence, or even acting within the changes outlined in Natural 
Resources Code Chapter 122.002. This means, where the surface owner has 
not sold the water to the operator, the surface estate still owns all the water 
in the storage tanks, the storage ponds, inside transportation pipes and 
trucks, and at the wellbore. Once again, operators have only a usufruct 
when it comes to land use of the surface estate, including groundwater.
54
 
At no point in the stages prior to pumping the freshwater down the 
fraced well, does Texas jurisprudence qualify or describe freshwater in any 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. (describing the location and storage of fresh groundwater during the process of 
fracing). 
 50. See Frac Focus Chemical Disclosure Registry, Hydrologic Fracturing: The Process, 
https://fracfocus.org/hydrologic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydrologic-fracturing-process 
[https://perma.cc/DW5V-QUDX] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (describing the location and 
storage of fresh groundwater during the process of fracing). 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. Chapter 122.002 (providing no condition of the 
freshwater ownership status prior to exiting the well as “wastewater”; without any express 
change within the law, it is valid to consider groundwater to be owned by the surface); See 
also Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy, 
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and 
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of 
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p. 19, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3 
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZG7C-3PGQ] (describing the economic benefit of investing large amounts of infrastructure 
during oil and gas operations). 
 54. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1972) (“The oil and gas lessee’s 
estate is the dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an express provision 
for payment, of free use of such part and so much of the premises as is reasonably necessary 
to effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regard for the rights of the owner of the 
surface estate.”) (emphasis added). 
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other sense than being a fee simple proprietary ownership right of the 
surface. Texas common law doctrine of ensuring the mineral estate is 
dominant has evolved with technology, but fundamentally, still provides 
both estates benefit from this doctrine.
55 
Surface owners who purchase after 
the land has been severed, have undoubtedly done so at a discount. 
Likewise, mineral interest owners who negotiated the purchase price of 
their interest have done so with the hope that their interest will be 
productive.
56 
Therefore, Texas common law understands surface owners 
most likely have already benefited from their interest prior to the 
exploitation of the mineral estate.
57 
Because of this concept, the scale of this 
usufructuary right is not a factor in changing the delicate balance of 
ownership between the estates. 
Further, with the Edwards Aquifer opinion, Texas jurisprudence put an 
end to any question pertaining to the ownership of groundwater.
58 
Coupled 
with Texas’s common law, this decision solidified groundwater as a part of 
the realty, for this comment, that is to say, groundwater will be considered 
part of the surface; “We now hold that this correctly states the common law 
regarding the ownership of groundwater in place.”
59 
Therefore, during this 
stage, absent any contractual agreement, legal ownership of groundwater is 
still a vested property right of the surface estate. 
  
                                                                                                             
 55. Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. Number One v. Haupt, Inc.: “It 
is a well-established doctrine from the earliest days of the common law that the right to the 
minerals carries with it the right to enter and extract them, and all other such incidents 
thereto as are necessary to be used for getting and enjoying them. This common law right 
was created “because a grant or reservation of minerals would be wholly worthless if the 
grantee or reserver could not enter upon the land in order to explore for and extract the 
minerals.” 854 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. 1993) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Harris v. 
Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1944)). 
 56. Standard Oil and Gas Surface Use Agreements often include costs of affecting 
hunting and fishing activities; these agreements take into account many factors of the surface 
owner’s use of his own land. 
 57. See TDC Engineering, Inc. v. Dunlap, 686 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. App.—Eastland 
1985) (“A grant of minerals would be worthless to a grantee if he could not enter upon the 
land for exploration and extraction of the minerals granted.” (quoting Ball v. Dillard, 602 
S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980)).  
 58. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 832 (Tex. 2012) (“By ownership 
of groundwater as real property, the Legislature appears to mean ownership in place”). 
 59. Id.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
490 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 6 
  
 
2. From Well-Head to Mineral Formation and Back 
With millions of gallons of freshwater prepped and in frac ponds prior to 
fracing, the legal ownership has not changed.
60 
During this process, four 
distinct stages require large amounts of freshwater to effectuate the fracing 
operation.
61 
These stages utilize the extracted groundwater for the purpose 
of effectuating hydrocarbon extraction. As the freshwater and chemical 
mixture is pumped thousands of feet into the formation below, legal 
ownership between the surface owner and the operator regarding the 
groundwater has not changed.
62
  
During the acid stage, several thousand gallons of fresh water are used to 
dissolve material in the well bore.
63 
This is not always required for every 
formation; the necessity of this stage depends on the calcium concentration 
within the rock formation. The pad stage demands approximately 100,000 
gallons of freshwater be forced down the well bore to prime the pump and 
to allow the bore to reach pressure.
64 
The prop stage allows the operator to 
add either fine or course material to make the capture of the minerals more 
efficient. This stage can use up to one hundred thousand gallons of 
freshwater.
65 
After the capture of minerals, freshwater is again used in the 
flushing stage to flush out additional material from the well prior to closing 
it.
66 
No matter how many chemicals are introduced during these stages, 
98% to 99.5% of the material pumped into the well is water and sand.
67
 
It is important to distinguish common practices among operators at this 
stage of the operation. After the formation is fractured and the operator 
begins pumping out fluid from the well, the concurrent process of 
                                                                                                             
 60. See Frac Focus Chemical Disclosure Registry, Hydrologic Fracturing: The Process, 
https://fracfocus.org/hydrologic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydrologic-fracturing-process 
[https://perma.cc/DW5V-QUDX] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (describing the volume and 
storage of fresh groundwater during the process of fracing). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Frac Focus Chemical Disclosure Registry, Hydrologic Fracturing: The Process, 
https://fracfocus.org/hydrologic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydrologic-fracturing-process 
[https://perma.cc/DW5V-QUDX] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (describing the location and 
storage of fresh groundwater during the process of fracing); See also See Tex. Nat. Res. 
Code § 122.002 (providing no condition of the freshwater status prior to exiting the well as 
“wastewater”). 
 63. Id. (describing the first stage of fresh groundwater use during the process of 
fracing). 
 64. See Id. (describing the second stage of fresh groundwater during the process of 
fracing). 
 65. See Id. (describing the third stage of fresh groundwater during the process of 
fracing). 
 66. See Id. (describing the last stage of fresh groundwater during the process of fracing). 
 67. Id. 
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separating minerals, water, and chemicals can begin.
68 
Once separated, the 
minerals go to the producer, the chemicals are either reused or disposed of, 
and the water is transported away by truck or pipe to salt water disposal 
wells.
69 
Traditionally, the operator paid for a waste disposal service to truck 
away the water, sand, and chemicals to an offsite deep injection well.
70
 
Alternatively, the operator could provide its own waste disposal service 
or entirely contract out waste disposal services.
71 
Even though the water 
was being trucked to a disposal site located off the land of the surface 
owner, surface owners were happy to permit operators to dispose of the 
unusable water because the operator was statutorily obligated to properly 
dispose of post-fracing waste.
72 
However, this “implied permission” did not 
transfer any property rights.
 
Texas has distinguished the chemical composition of groundwater owned 
by the surface estate from other similar liquid materials found underground. 
In Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., the operator took saltwater from 
the surface estate to re-pressurize the mineral formation for the oil-bearing 
rock to remain stable.
73 
Relying on the word “water” in the lease, the 
operator argued it was only liable to reimburse the surface owner for the 
freshwater used.
74 
“Water,” to the operator, meant only freshwater. The 
Texas Supreme Court disagreed, “[W]ater is never absolutely pure unless it 
is treated in a laboratory. It is the water with which these parties are 




The next year the Texas Supreme Court lent further insight into 
identifying groundwater in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. West.
76 
In Humble 
Oil, a dispute arose between an operator and royalty interest owner 
pertaining to the comingling of native gas and produced gas.
77 
The court 
held, “the confusion of goods theory attaches only when the commingled 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law Conference, 
Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities and Potential 
Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the number of parties involved 
in dealing with post fracing waste in the context of operators and third parties). 
 72. See tit. 16, pt. 1, ch. 3 Tex. Admin. Code, § 3.9 (2020) (providing regulations on the 
use and treatment of “wastewater.”). 
 73. Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Tex. 1973). 
 74. Id. at 867. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1974). 
 77. Id.  
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Therefore, if the surface-owned freshwater is going into the well as a 
usufruct by the operator, it is an asset of the surface estate. When it is 
mixed with chemicals, pumped down into the formation, and returned as 
produced liquid, it becomes part of the production stream. However, when 
operators recycle the produced liquid, the recycled water is separated from 
the hydrocarbons. As in Humble Oil and Robinson, ascertaining what is 
groundwater is a question of fact. 
With the rise of water treatment technologies came the rise in operators 
looking to take advantage of this common practice.
79 
Instead of disposing of 
the backflow water, operators set up treatment technologies to bring the 
backflow water to a state clean enough to be reused. Once recycled, the 
operators either sold the water for industrial use, reused it in the same well, 
or stored it for future use (on either the same tract or a nearby tract). Thus, 
operators created a market through ingenuity.
80 
Depending on the 




All questions concerning the use of groundwater are resolved when the 
surface owner sells groundwater to the operator; because the cost of 
groundwater sold by the surface owner to operators ranges from ten to 
seventy-five cents—depending on demand and location—the cost of frac 
water is a significant expense to the operator. Where the operator relies on 
the doctrine of correlative rights, the use of the flowback water is limited to 
use on the land covered by the lease, or acreage pooled therein.
82
 
Throughout the entire fracing process, the operator must dance the 
delicate usufruct dance. Once the purchased backflow water is recycled, it 
can be used for another tract of land or sold. Recognizing this proprietary 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id.  
 79. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the 
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21 
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (describing the effect market operators have created by 
recycling fracing water). 
 80. See Id.. (describing the market operators have created by recycling fracing water). 
 81. See Gabriel Collins, Frac Ranching vs. Cattle Ranching: Exploring the Economic 
Motivations Behind Operator-Surface Owner Conflicts over Produced Water Recycling 
Projects, Issue Brief, Baker Inst. for Public Pol’y, Rice University (Oct. 17, 2017) 
(comparing how the value of water sold to hydrologic fracturing producers can be more 
lucrative than traditional cattle farming). 
 82. See Robinson, 501 S.W.2d at867 (explaining the use of the implied right by the 
dominant estate does not extend to an ownership interest in the property used). 
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issue, operators and producers sought help from the Texas Legislature to 
codify their new practice.
83
 
3. Voluntary Agreements or Legislative Intervention  
Some operators and producers have invested billions of dollars into 
water treatment technologies since 2013.
84 
To protect their investment, 




In Texas, some operators have preemptively entered into surface use 
agreements with landowners that contain groundwater sales provisions.
86 
Unlike New Mexico, Texas does not have a surface use statute. These 
surface use agreements are not required by the Texas Legislature or the 
Railroad Commission, but merely codify the duties and obligations of each 
party prior to and during operations. Contained within these agreements are 
reimbursement rates not limited to wildlife killed by operations, land 
damage, and the cost of groundwater used during all stages of the fracing 
process.
87 
Even where the operator has no legal obligation to the surface 
owner other than the common law doctrines described above, some 
operators and producers contract with surface owners to express their 
respective duties and obligations.  
Given the massive investment in infrastructure required to exploit 
minerals for each tract—and given the desire to take full advantage of this 
                                                                                                             
 83. See William C. Mumby, Trust in Local Government: How States’ Legal Obligations 
to Protect Water Resources Can Support Local Efforts to Restrict Fracing, 44 Ecology L.Q. 
195, 202 (2017) (“[S]tates act as the primary regulators of the practice.”). See also House 
Comm. on Energy Resources, List of Witnesses, Tex. H.B. 3246, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019) 
(describing the private parties testifying for and against House Bill 3246). 
 84. See generally Austin C. Whitmore, Oilfield Recycling in Texas: Why Command 
and Control Regulations are Stifling the End Goal, 44 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 287, 292 (Sept. 2014) 
(“A 2011 study by the Texas Water Development Board estimated that only 3% of injected 
frac water is recycled in Texas.”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 70-12-5 (West) (outlining the 
requirements of surface use agreements prior to the commencement of oil and gas 
operations). 
 85. Marathon Oil led an initiative to remove barriers to using produced water in new 
Mexico, https://www.marathonoil.com/Sustainability-Report/Highlights/Water-Manage 
ment/ [https://perma.cc/NKG8-KRAL] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (describing the way a 
major producer and operator will look to the New Mexico Legislature to change the law in 
the same way they lobbied the Texas Legislature). 
 86. See generally Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law 
Conference, Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities 
and Potential Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the contractual 
relationships between parties at all stages of the fracing operational process). 
 87. Id.  
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investment through backflow water recycling, it is sensible to stave off 
conflicts by negotiating with the surface owner through a “groundwater 
sales agreement” or “surface use agreement” prior to the commencement of 
operations. As the water used in fracing becomes more valuable than cattle 
ranching or agriculture, operators have anticipated conflicts with surface 
owners—surface owners understand the importance of groundwater. Every 
drop is important.
88 
For example, land owners have negotiated to calculate 
of the volume payable by the quantity of the water measured at the well 
head rather than the backside of the frac pond.
89
  
This simple detail can save the landowner thousands of dollars in lost 
water sales. After being pumped from the ground, the water can sit in open 
frac ponds for days or weeks before arriving at the fracing well site. If the 
calculation occurs at the water well, evaporation is of no concern, but if the 
operator calculates water use at the fracing site, operators are not paying for 
any evaporated water.
90 
Because fracing operations require substantial use 
of the surface estate, these practical details are of the utmost importance to 
landowners. 
Modern surface use agreements have anticipated conflict to the point that 
operators have begun to buy the groundwater from the surface owner prior 
to use—even when the operator has no obligation to do so.
91 
Operators 
understand the legal “grey area” of ownership when water is recycled and 
have solved this issue with purchase agreements within surface use 
contracts.
92 
However, given the expense of groundwater, operators have 
solved one problem to buy another. 
                                                                                                             
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy, 
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and 
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of 
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p.6, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3 
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154- f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZG7C-3PGQ] (“Hauling water away from well pads via truck can cost anywhere from $1 to 
$5 per barrel depending on travel distance and terrain, which can be prohibitively expensive 
when compared to the $.30 it reportedly costs to pipe water from a production well to a 
disposal well.”). 
 91. See generally Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law 
Conference, Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities 
and Potential Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the contractual 
relationships between parties at all stages of the fracing operational process). 
 92. See Gabriel Collins, Frac Ranching vs. Cattle Ranching: Exploring the Economic 
Motivations Behind Operator-Surface Owner Conflicts over Produced Water Recycling 
Projects, Issue Brief, Baker Inst. for Public Pol’y, Rice University (Oct. 17, 2017) 
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The reason for recycling post-fracing water or backflow water is to lower 
the operator’s costs. If operators are going to buy the water and recycle, 
they have effectively lowered their margins only to the extent of the virgin 
water saved. However, if operators do not purchase groundwater and must 
therefore rely on the correlative rights doctrine limited in how and where 
the backflow water may be used, “Costs expended on such technologies 
would create no cost or economic benefits for the mineral interest owner, 
and the implementation of water treatment technologies would yield to less 
costly disposal well alternatives.”
93 
Thus, operators and producers began to 
look for legislative ways to protect their recycling investments without the 
need for legally preemptive surface use agreements.  
III. Legislative History and Importance 
A. Regulatory History of Oil and Gas in Texas  
With the Texas Railroad Commission (“RRC”) and Texas Commission 
on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) gently stepping around the regulatory 
use of water for oil and gas operations, it is easy to become lost in the 
practical process of how operators use water. The scope of water use for 
operators must always be described, absent written agreement and for the 
reasons stated above, in terms of usage.
94 
Therefore, groundwater always 
begins as an asset of the surface estate, or the estate where the severance 
has occurred, but is not granted to the lessee under the terms of a typical oil 
and gas lease.
95 
Its use is dictated according to the common law doctrine of 
correlative rights. The historical evolution of mineral law in Texas has 
nourished the oil and gas industry in many ways.
96
 
                                                                                                             
(comparing how the value of water sold to hydrologic fracturing producers can be more 
lucrative than traditional cattle farming). 
 93. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the 
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21 
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (describing the market that operators have created by 
recycling fracing water). 
 94. Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1961) (“We agree that the owner-
operator of the lease has the right to use so much of the land, both surface and subsurface, as 
is reasonably necessary to comply with the terms of the lease contract and to carry out the 
purposes and intentions of the parties.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 95. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d at 810 (“The oil and gas lessee’s estate is the 
dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an express provision for 
payment, of free use of such part and so much of the premises as is reasonably necessary to 
effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regard for the rights of the owner of the 
surface estate.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 96. See generally John Burritt McArthur, Stewarding Public Oil, Gas, and Hard 
Minerals: The Express and Implied Development Rights that Protect Public Resources, 9 
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Recognizing the importance of being an energy leader throughout the 
world, Texas legislative acts have gone to great lengths to perfect property 
rights in relation to the theory of mineral ownership in place.
97
 The goal of 
oil and gas legislative regulation has been the ability of lawmakers and 
regulators to balance the exploration and exploitation of natural resources 
with the absolute right of property ownership.
98 
Even though the methods of 
exploration and production have been revolutionized through technology, 
the legislature has sought to reinforce the moniker of the independent 
producer, “rise early, work hard, strike oil.”
99
 
The primary way the Texas Legislature ensured the perpetuity of the 
hydrocarbon energy sector was how it structured the oversight of the energy 
industry.
100 
Texas established the Railroad Commission in 1890, but it 
wasn’t until 1917 that the legislature declared pipelines to be “common 
carriers” that the RRC was able to regulate the energy industry.
101 
From 
1917 to 1939, the legislature would enact new statutes or amend the Natural 
Resource Code a total of thirty-six times.
102 
 
These acts would serve to clarify the scope and authority of the RRC in 
comparison with the ever-growing oil and gas producers; these acts would 
                                                                                                             
Tex. J. Oil Gas & Energy L. 215, 250 (July 2014) (treats leases obligating lessees to produce 
by the end of the primary term as requiring actual production in paying quantities); see also 
2 Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.4 (2019) (“Texas governors, legislators, attorneys general, and 
Railroad Commissioners are concerned not just with preventing waste in the oil and gas 
fields but with the state’s economy as a whole—with employment levels, tax revenues, 
investment opportunities, and the maintenance of competition. When the size of the state’s 
oil and gas wealth became apparent, its distribution among citizens also became a political 
matter.”). 
 97. See Ernest E. Smith and Jacqueline Lang Weaver, 2 Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.3 
(LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2015) (Not surprisingly, the Texas Legislature enacted various 
tax incentives to offset the deteriorating market conditions faced by the oil industry.”); see 
generally 2 Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.4 (2019) (outlining the evolution of Texas’ statutory 
scheme incentivizing exploration and production of oil and gas). 
 98. See generally 2 Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.4 (2019) (outlining the evolution of 
Texas’ statutory scheme incentivizing exploration and production of oil and gas). 
 99. J. Paul Getty Quotes, BrainyQuote.com, 2019. https://www.brainyquote.com/ 
quotes/j_paul_getty_100065 [https://perma.cc/JS7P-FMFS] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019). 
 100. Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 153 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Tex. 1941) (describing the 
interaction between the regulatory institutions that affect the oil and gas industry). 
 101. See History of the Railroad Commission 1866-1939, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/ 
about-us/history/history-1866-1939 [https://perma.cc/JQ8N-XB5C] (last visited Dec. 30, 
2019) (“Legislature declares pipelines to be common carriers, and gives Railroad 
Commission jurisdiction over same. This is the first act to designate the Railroad 
Commission as the agency to administer the conservation laws relating to oil and gas.”).   
 102. Id. (describing the major events in history for the Texas Railroad Commission).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss3/8
2021] Where Correlative Rights End and Taking Begins 497 
 
 
include the authority to issue statewide proration orders
103
, physical waste 
standards
104
, market manipulation limitations
105
, and the well spacing 
rule.
106
 In 1941, with the Lone Star Gas Co. v. State decision, the RRC rate 
consideration orders were to be considered “legislative” in nature
107
. 
Therefore, the RRC would be able to expand its regulatory authority and 
scope without a specific enactment by the legislature. This is evidenced by 
the decreasing number of changes to the Natural Resource Code in the 
years following this decision. From 1940-1980, the legislature amended or 
expanded the Natural Resources Code only another twenty-two times.
108 
From 1980-2009, only four legislative changes occurred regarding the 
Natural Resources Code.
109  
To understand the relationship of the RRC and the legislature is to 
understand energy politics in Texas—incentives to explore and produce oil 
and gas in Texas go hand in hand with explicit and implicit rights of both 
the mineral and surface estates. The current three RRC commissioners have 
a combined total of 70 years’ experience in the energy, business, and 
engineering sectors.
110 
They have worked both in the public and private 
business sectors; and some have had experience in the financial sector.
111 
Even though these commissioners are popularly elected or appointed by the 
Governor during a vacancy in a largely conservative state, they are clearly 
dedicated to their mission “to serve Texas by our stewardship of natural 
resources and the environment, our concern for personal and community 
                                                                                                             
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. See History of the Railroad Commission 1980-1999, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/ 
about-us/history/history-1980-1999/ [https://perma.cc/GR4E-4FLV] (last visited Dec. 30, 
2019) (describing the major events in history for the Texas Railroad Commission). 
 109. See History of the Railroad Commission, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-
us/history/history-2000-2009/ [https://perma.cc/2ZN3-D6LP] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) 
(describing the major events in history for the Texas Railroad Commission).  
 110. See 2 Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.4 (2019) (“However, the authority to regulate the 
oil and gas fields in Texas naturally carries with it the power to manage the Texas economy. 
Railroad Commissioners are elected officials who operate in the same environment as the 
lawmakers who create the policy framework. Not surprisingly, then, they have viewed their 
role as managers of the Texas economy and have acted accordingly.”). 
 111. See Commissioners, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/commissioners/ [https:// 
perma.cc/W87N-FFBE] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (providing the background of the current 
commissioners for the Texas Railroad Commission). 
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safety, and our support of enhanced development and economic vitality for 
the benefit of Texans.”
112
 
The scope of the RRC’s regulatory power over the oil and gas is broad 
and has expanded over time. First and foremost, correlative rights have 
mainly been protected by the courts and statutory guidance because the 
RRC has had a tough time walking the proprietary interest tightrope: 
The Natural Resources Code evidences near-schizophrenia 
regarding the commission’s power and duty to protect 
correlative rights. Chapter 85 of the code, which involves oil 
conservation, never uses the phrase “correlative rights.” Chapter 
86 on gas conservation is replete with references to the need to 
protect correlative rights. Chapter 111 on common carriers and 
common purchasers is based on the principle that all producers 
should have equal access, without discrimination, to pipelines, a 
principle imbued with the concept of protecting correlative 
rights. Chapter 102, the Mineral Interest Pooling Act, openly 
acknowledges the protection of correlative rights as one of its 




“The directive of the RRC is not to define what interests parties currently 
have, but to simply regulate and “protect the correlative rights of different 
interest owners.”
114 
When there is a gap or need for interpretation, the 
courts have filled the gap.  
Just as confusing is how the RRC and the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality share the responsibility of regulating water for the 
purpose of oil and gas exploration and exploitation. However, no matter 
how confusing the relationship of regulation and legislative acts have 
become, the theme has been steady— legislative acts evolve with the 
regulatory nature of the oil and gas sector—and have generally not altered 
                                                                                                             
 112. Texas Railroad Commission Mission Statement, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-
us/organization-activities/mission-statement/ [https://perma.cc/N8JF-22Y7] (last visited Dec. 
30, 2019). 
 113. Ernest E. Smith and Jacqueline Lang Weaver, 2 Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.3 
(LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2015). 
 114. See Texas Railroad Commission, Oil and Gas Division, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/ 
about-us/organization-activities/divisions-of-the-rrc/oil-gas-division/ [https://perma.cc/ 
KDF2-NLCA] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (explaining how the Railroad Commission 
delegates its duties and responsibilities within the regulation of the oil and gas industry in 
Texas). 
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long established common law property rights.
115 
The relationship of the 
RRC and the Texas Legislature is not the aim of this comment; this 
background is meant to provide context into why legislative intervention in 
the oil and gas industry reverberates so profoundly. 
B. Legislative History and Intent of House Bill 3246 
Eight words contained in House Bill 3246 have changed the relationship 
between surface owners and operators by codifying a practice which alters 
property ownership in favor of one party, and transfers the same property to 
another party, without means of compensation.
116 
By breaking down the 
way the legislature went about codifying this practice, the creation of my 
first sentence in this paragraph is not an oversimplification.  
The intent of the legislature was to codify the way operators dealt with 
the “waste of oil and gas fluid.”
117 
By reframing the issue of groundwater 
ownership in dealing with the post fracing fluid waste, the legislature seeks 
to avoid expressly regranting proprietary rights. 
Texas Representative Drew Darby introduced House Bill 3246 to clear 
up the perceived “ambiguity relating to ownership between water haulers 
and oil and gas operators.”
118 
Although this reasoning is factually true and 
seeks to clarify the current practices of the operators, the intended 
ambiguity to be resolved is not between haulers and operators—the legal 
ambiguity of ownership is between the operators and surface owners. 
  
                                                                                                             
 115. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy, 
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and 
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of 
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p. 24, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3 
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZG7C-3PGQ] (“[Produced water] ownership is a private property issue, however its 
management as a waste is the operator’s responsibility under the existing regulatory 
framework.”). 
 116. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, H.B. 3246, 86th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (describing the background on the issue of post fracing waste 
fluid and why the change was necessary); H.B. 2767, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess., Ch. 209, § 1 
(Tex. 2013) (amended 2015 and 2019) (2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 209 (West), current 
version at Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 122.002 (West 2019)) (describing the changes to the 
Natural Resources Code).  
 117. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, H.B. 3246, 86th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (describing the background on the issue of post fracing waste 
fluid and why the change was necessary). 
 118. Id.  
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1. Waste or Water? 
Crucial to all rights held in the law is how we define terms. In construing 
a statute, “[o]ur primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature’s 
intent, which we ascertain from the plain meaning of the words used in the 
statute, if possible.” Southwest Royalties, Inc., 500 S.W.3d at 404. Stated 
differently, “[i]f a statute is worded clearly, we must honor its plain 
language, unless that interpretation would lead to absurd results.” Combs v. 
Health Care Servs. Corp., 401 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2013). “Undefined 
terms in a statute are typically given their ordinary meaning, but if a 
different or more precise definition is apparent from the term’s use in the 
context of the statute, we apply that meaning.” TGS-NOPEC Geophysical 
Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). “We further consider 
statutes as a whole rather than their isolated provisions.”
119
 
The Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.001 defines several terms used 
throughout the statute. In the bill analysis, the author of the bill takes steps 
to ensure that changes outlined in House Bill 3246 are uniform with other 
definitions running throughout the Natural Resource Code. 
The author of the bill seeks to ensure “waste” is properly defined. 
“Waste” in terms of the Natural Resources Code is “fluid oil and gas waste 
as waste containing salt or other mineralized substances, brine, hydrologic 
fracturing fluid, flowback water, produced water or other fluid that arises 
out of or is incidental to the production of oil and gas.”
120 
With the 
definition of “waste” including “flowback water, produced water, or other 
fluid,” the Natural Resource Code is using one definition to describe 
multiple substances subject to differing ownership.
121
 
Practically, “waste” comes out of the fraced well altogether prior to the 
operator separating hydrocarbons from the rest of the production stream.
122 
Therefore, even when the freshwater is mixed with the fracing fluid during 
the preparation stage, ownership of each ingredient of the fluid can be 
ascertained.
123 
For example, the freshwater, which was previously 
                                                                                                             
 119. Corning v. Hegar, 534 S.W.3d 28, 30 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017). 
 120. See House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246, 86th Leg., 
R.S. (2019) (discussing how waste is defined in the context of oil and gas operations). 
 121. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246, 
86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (describing the background on the issue of post fracing waste fluid 
and the why the change was necessary). 
 122. See Adrian C Hedden, Chevron Recycles, Reuses Fracing Water From Oil and Gas 
as Permian Production Booms, (Nov. 2, 2019) https://www.currentargus.com/ 
story/news/local/2019/11/03/chevron-recycles-reuses-fracing-water-oil-gas/4121964002/ 
[https://perma.cc/5XTF-LJEK] (coming from a large producer and operator on how they 
classify material coming out of the fracing well). 
 123. Id.  
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groundwater and belonged to the surface owner where not purchased by the 
operator and prior to it becoming frac fluid, is not “waste” but is part of the 
usufruct of the operator; with the surface owner having the ownership 
interest. However, when “every liquid incidental to the production of oil 
and gas” is defined as “waste” after returning from the formation, any 
application of this definition to describe ownership rights could potentially 




As previously stated, surface owners are perfectly happy with the 
operators dealing with all “waste” associated with fracing according to 
statutory requirements; so that, “management of oil and gas waste has been 
a cost absorbed by operators.”
125 
However, once the operators recycle the 
water it is no longer “waste”, and they should not have acquired title to the 
water. 
2. Protecting the Investment 
With fresh groundwater increasing in value and land owners becoming 
more informed about the implementation of water treatment technologies, 
operators and producers sought the assistance of the Texas Legislature to 
codify the ownership status of post-fracing recycled wastewater.
126 
Operators knew they were legally protected in extracting the groundwater 
for use in their exploitation of the minerals, but in order to safeguard their 
practices after exploitation occurs, establishing the right to production 
stream and subsequent disposal was essential.
127
  
Supporters for the proposed change in the Natural Resource Code 
avoided the impact this change in ownership could produce. 
Acknowledging the cost of waste management operators absorb as a result 
                                                                                                             
 124. See House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246, 86th Leg., 
R.S. (2019) (describing how the Texas Legislature defines waste). 
 125. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246, 
86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (describing the background on the issue of post fracing waste fluid 
and the why the change was necessary). 
 126. See Managing Water Use in Hydrologic Fracturing, https://www.chevron.com/ 
corporate-responsibility/environment/water [https://perma.cc/KP6A-39P6] (last visited Dec. 
30, 2019) (outlining how a major operator and producer manages water during fracing 
operations). 
 127. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy, 
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and 
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of 
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p. 25, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3 
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZG7C-3PGQ] (“[i]n some cases, midstream customers have voluntarily paid a recycle 
royalty just to “keep the peace” which makes recycling less competitive”). 
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of fracing, legislators in support offered to allow operators to own the waste 
they were already disposing of via deep salt water injection wells.
128 
Supporters would further offer this change as an incentive to operators to 
recycle and reduce the need for additional exploitation of fresh 
groundwater.
129 
The solution legislators offer to land owners is “to account 
for this in future agreements.”
130 
This reasoning implicitly ignores the 
practicality recycling has created within the system of proprietary rights 
Texas has perpetuated. 
Operators have no legal obligation or duty to contractually account for 
“waste” with land owners in a severed estate.
131 
As described above, 
“preemptive” surface use agreements were utilized by operators to stave off 
legal challenges when it came to the “grey area” of post recycled 
water/waste. However, with the codifying of ownership of this material, 
operators have no incentive to ensure the land owner interest in the of post-
fracing fluid (including previously injected groundwater). Practically, the 
operator could only rely on correlative rights doctrine for its use of the land 
owner’s groundwater from the commencement of operations until the 
“water” returns to the surface of the fracing well—from now on, operators 
can rely on Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.001 to legally protect them 
after their implied usufruct has expired.
132 
Therefore, with this change in 
ownership, the benefit to operators is significant.
133
  
                                                                                                             
 128. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246, 
86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (describing the background on the issue of post fracing waste fluid 
and the why the change was necessary). 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Chapter 122.002 (providing no condition of the freshwater 
status prior to exiting the well as “wastewater.”). 
 132. See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Chapter 122.001 (providing no condition of the freshwater 
status prior to exiting the well as “wastewater.”). 
 133. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy, 
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and 
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of 
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p.6, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3 
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZG7C-3PGQ] (“[h]auling water away from well pads via truck can cost anywhere from $1 
to 5 per barrel depending on travel distance and terrain, which can be prohibitively 
expensive when compared to the $.30 it reportedly costs to pipe water from a production 
well to a disposal well”). 
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With value of water increasing, whether fresh or recycled, opponents for 
the bill understood the true consequence of the bill.
134 
In other words, the 
parties whose interests were not addressed in House Bill 3246 were the 
parties whose legal rights were affected by House Bill 3246. 
3. What is “Beneficial Use?” 
Water is now a strategic planning factor for fracing operations and major 
producers.
135 
One of the main goals of the bill was to incentivize operators 
to recycle post fracing water by clarifying ownership after extracting the 
minerals.
136 
By incentivizing recycling, the state would be said to have a 
stronger reason to alter certain property rights. The House Bill sought to 
incentivize recycling post-fracing water by stating the operator could own 
the post-fracing water (“waste”) only if it takes the water for “the purpose 
of treating the waste for a subsequent beneficial use.”
137 
One of the issues in 
understanding the overall aim of this House Bill is the legislature did not 
define “treatment”—and more importantly, “beneficial use.”
138
 
Prior to water treatment technologies, many operators would contract out 
the waste disposal services after extracting the minerals.
139 
These waste 
removal services would transport all waste material to a treatment site well 
                                                                                                             
 134. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246, 
86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (describing the background on the issue of post fracing waste fluid 
and the why the change was necessary). 
 135. See Adrian C Hedden, Chevron Recycles, Reuses Fracing Water From Oil and Gas 
as Permian Production Booms, (Nov. 2, 2019) https://www.currentargus.com/ 
story/news/local/2019/11/03/chevron-recycles-reuses-fracing- water-oil-gas/4121964002/ 
[https://perma.cc/5XTF-LJEK]; see also Diamondback Energy Corporate Report, 2019, p. 
10, https://www.diamondbackenergy.com/static-files/5ab827ab-4b26-47ee-9e16-4d1b27 
3d37a3 [https://perma.cc/MDZ3-RNRK] (including recycling statistics in corporate report, 
one of the major operators in the Permian Basin stated “[o]ur use of recycled water for 
completions increased to 10.7% of total water used in completions in 2018, compared with 
less than 1% in 2017”).   
 136. See House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246, 86th Leg., 
R.S. (2019) (understanding the intentions of the Texas Legislature by introducing House Bill 
3246). 
 137. Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 122.002. 
 138. Id.  
 139. See Adrian C Hedden, Chevron Recycles, Reuses Fracing Water From Oil and Gas 
as Permian Production Booms, (Nov. 2, 2019) https://www.currentargus.com/story/ 
news/local/2019/11/03/chevron-recycles-reuses-fracing-water-oil-gas/4121964002/ [https:// 
perma.cc/5XTF-LJEK]; see generally Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas 
Law Conference, Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, 
Opportunities and Potential Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the 
contractual relationships between parties at all stages of the fracing operational process). 
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away from the fracing well.
140 
Prior to injecting the waste in a deep-water 
injection well, the waste treatment company would fill very large tanks with 
the liquid waste, skim as much leftover hydrocarbons off the top, and sell 
what they could (this is how they made a profit).
141 
The rest would be 
deposited in the saltwater disposal well. The operation of the waste disposal 
company treating the liquid waste—albeit one could say treating the waste 
to ensure all hydrocarbons are harvested for the beneficial use of not 
returning hydrocarbons into the ground—could meet the meaning of 
Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.002. 
While the House Research Organization bill analysis states “recycling 
and treatment,” the final bill and Code are moot in describing the way 
treatment of waste for a “beneficial use” are supposed to occur.
142 
While the 
bill analysis helps us understand the problem to be solved, the enacted 
statute must be taken on its face. Without defining “beneficial use” in the 
enacted statute, the threshold operators must meet to effectuate the transfer 
of property ownership is ambiguous. Therefore, the specific intent of the 
legislature to incentivize post-fracing waste water treatment may not be 
realized. 
IV. As Applied, Texas Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.002 is a Taking 
The relationship of real property in Texas has been balanced through 
jurisprudence, proprietary doctrines, and, when necessary, legislative 
statutes. This balance has defined an oil and gas industry that has led the 
world in ground breaking technology and exploitation practices. However, 
it takes two to tango.
143 
Operators could not exploit minerals without the 
rights given to them under the law (express or implied) or by agreement via 
the surface owner. Therefore, legislation taking property from one estate to 
give to another outright without compensation not only goes too far, but 
effectively diminishes that original property value to zero. 
  
                                                                                                             
 140. See generally Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law 
Conference, Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities 
and Potential Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the contractual 
relationships between parties at all stages of the fracing operational process). 
 141. Id.  
 142. Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 122.002. 
 143. See generally Gabriel Collins, How Produced Water's Economic Value is Evolving 
in the Permian Basin, Shale Play Water Management, 22 October 2019, Houston, TX 
(describing the multi-tiered decision-making process when operators think about treating 
produced water). 
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A. Current Interpretation of the Regulatory Taking Doctrine 
The current regulatory taking doctrine has been relatively unchanged 
since the Supreme Court decided Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City.
144 
The Penn Central decision outlined factors by which courts apply to 
determine if government action, although not a direct invasion, has 
constituted a taking.
145 
By focusing on the nature and extent of the 
regulation, the analysis will always be one of degree.
146 
However, it is well 
settled when regulation goes to a degree as to effectuate a total conversion 
of value without compensation, it is a taking.
147 
Total conversion is 
construed as a regulation denying “all economically beneficial or 
productive use of land.”
148
 
Even when the government regulation does not effectuate a total 
economic deprivation of the property, the Court will weigh factors to 
determine the validity of the taking claim, including: the economic impact 
of the regulation; interference with investor backed expectations; and the 
“character of the governmental action.”
149 
The Supreme Court has made it 
clear, property rights well established according to state law will be 
respected.
150 
However, to that extent, property rights cannot be confiscated 
by the government in favor of one party to the detriment of another.  
Following the United States Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court 
outlined two distinct categories for analyzing whether a regulatory taking 
has occurred. 
One is where regulation ‘compels the property owner to suffer a 
physical ‘invasion’ of his property.’ The direct, physical effect 
on property, though short of government possession, makes the 
regulation categorically a taking. Another is “where regulation 
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.” To 
                                                                                                             
 144. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978). 
 145. Id. (articulating that: “this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action 
and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights”; see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922) (arguing that property regulated by the government can 
be taking if “it goes too far”). 
 146. See Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 673 (Tex. 2004). 
 147. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922) (arguing that 
property regulated by the government can be taking if “it goes too far”) 
 148. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017). 
 149. Id. (describing the factors courts should consider in takings cases); Connolly v. 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986) (describing the factors 
courts should consider in takings cases); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 519 (1998) 
(describing the factors courts should consider in takings cases). 
 150. Id.  
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deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of land is 
tantamount to depriving him of the land itself. But this is 
‘limited to ‘the extraordinary circumstance when no productive 
or economically beneficial use of land is permitted’” and ‘the 
landowner is left with a token interest.’ In addition to these two 
situations, the Supreme Court has stated that regulation ‘effects a 




With regulatory taking jurisprudence not as evolved as most constitutional 
law, the Court cautions lower courts to look the totality of circumstances 
surrounding the actions of the government, and must include “a fact-
sensitive test of reasonableness.”
152 
Because the government is not 
physically invading the water rights of the surface owner, this analysis will 
focus on the category in which the government deprives the owner of all 
economically beneficial use of the property.
153
 
1. Standard of Review 
To determine if a regulation completely deprives the owner of all 
economically beneficial use, the court will make a determination of law if 
any act by the government that “denies an owner economically viable use 
of his land,” that regulation will constitute a taking.
154 
Following the Lucas 
decision, Texas considers the relevant factors to determine whether a 
regulatory taking has occurred.
155
  
The Texas Constitution mirrors the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution with respect to regulatory takings.
156 
While the Texas 
Constitution does allow for the taking of private property for public use, 
                                                                                                             
 151. Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 671 (Tex. 2004). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223 (1986) (“[G]iven the 
propriety of the governmental power to regulate, it cannot be said that the Taking Clause is 
violated whenever legislation requires one person to use his or her assets for the benefit of 
another”). 
 154. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992). 
 155. See Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 671 (Tex. 2004) 
(explaining the Texas Supreme Court uses an analogous standard of review for determining 
a regulatory taking that the United States Supreme Court); see also Sloan Creek II, L.L.C. v. 
N. Tex. Tollway Auth., 472 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015) (explaining what a party 
needs to prove to have a successful takings claim). 
 156. Compare U.S. Const. amend. I (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation”), with Tex. Const. Art. I, § 17 (“No person’s property shall be 
taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation 
being made”). 
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Texas clarifies our issue at hand, “‘public use’ does not include the taking 
of property… for transfer to a private entity for the primary purpose of 
economic development or enhancement of tax revenues.”
157
 
Currently, most Texas regulatory taking jurisprudence surrounds the use 
of zoning ordinances or land use regulations. Therefore, it would be 
difficult to determine what specific factors in the oil and gas sectors would 
be considered by the Texas Supreme Court if this law was to be challenged 
today.
158 
However, with the regulatory taking analysis proscribed by the 
highest court in the land—House Bill 3246 as applied in Texas Natural 
Resource Code Chapter 122.002 runs afoul of Article I § 17 of the Texas 
Constitution. 
B. Texas Natural Resources Code Chapter 122.002 is a Regulatory Taking 
1. Deprivation of Economic Use 
“Determining whether all economically viable use of a property has been 
denied entails a relatively simple analysis of whether value remains in the 
property after the governmental action.”
159  
Waste not, want not. Recycled backflow water is not waste. As detailed 
above, the process of the operator separating raw oil and gas products from 
water prior to refining adds credibility to the notion—the transfer of title of 




Historically, any liquid that was unrefined and sold by the operator was 
disposed of in deep, salt-water injection wells; this liquid included surface 
water that would be disposed of.
161 
This did not change the nature of the 
                                                                                                             
 157. Tex. Const. Art. I, § 17. 
 158. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (“Each aims to identify 
regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government 
directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain. Accordingly, each 
of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes upon 
private property rights. The Court has held that physical takings require compensation 
because of the unique burden they impose: A permanent physical invasion, however 
minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner's right to exclude others from 
entering and using her property -- perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests”); 
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
 159. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 935 (Tex. 1998). 
 160. See Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. 2011) 
(“[w]hether the government's actions are sufficient to constitute a taking is a question of 
law). 
 161. See generally Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law 
Conference, Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities 
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ownership, but the surface owner did not want to pay for nor be responsible 
for the transportation and disposal of the flow back water and the operator 
was obligated to deal with all wastes of all oil and gas.
162 
This comported 
with current jurisprudence because the operator ceased using the “surface 
water” once they extracted the minerals. 
However, because operators have created a market for recycled fracing 
wastewater, they have profited off property they have no ownership of.
163 
House Bill 3246 by way of Texas Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.002, 
as applied in practice, allows for transfer of legal title of surface water to 
the operators at the point the water returns from the pipe. Currently, this 
backflow liquid is treated in totality by the Texas Legislature as “waste” 
and property of the operator.
164 
Without compensation of the surface owner 




Regardless of House Bill 3246’s intent, which seeks to clarify the 
relationship between operators and third-party disposal or waste 
transportation companies, the resulting consequence following this “state 
action” is what surface owners will challenge, being the reduction of the 
pecuniary value of the backflow recycle water to the land owner to zero. 
In Texas, groundwater is a vested property interest.
166 
That property 
interest is specific, has value, and is transferable. This classification, as 
                                                                                                             
and Potential Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the contractual 
relationships between parties at all stages of the fracing operational process). 
 162. See generally Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law 
Conference, Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities 
and Potential Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the contractual 
relationships between parties at all stages of the fracing operational process). 
 163. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the 
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21 
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (explaining the market operators have created by recycling 
waste water). 
 164. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy, 
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and 
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of 
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p.18, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3 
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZG7C-3PGQ] (“[t]he premise of the legislation is that this is an oil field waste issue and not 
a water ownership issue”).  
 165. See Tex. Const. Art. I, § 17 (outlining what would constitute a regulatory taking 
which would violate the Texas Constitution). 
 166. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831-32 (Tex. 2012) (holding 
“In our state the landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas 
in place beneath his land. The only qualification of that rule of ownership is that it must be 
considered in connection with the law of capture and is subject to police regulations. The oil 
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previously mentioned in this comment, allows the operator to take the water 
after its usufruct has expired, make it more valuable, and profitable for the 
water owner. Once an operator invokes the terms of Natural Resource Code 
Chapter 122.002, without bargaining for the property, they render the 
surface owner’s property—water used for operations and recycled—
valueless. In effect, the surface owner is left with no economic value of the 
property, violating Article I § 17 of the Texas Constitution. 
2. Substantially Legitimate State Interest 
The government may affect a partial taking if there is a “substantially 
legitimate government interest,” such as encouraging recycling water.
167
 
Even though Texas Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.002 produces a 
total conversion, if the statute only produces a partial conversion of the 
surface owner’s property, it would not violate Article I § 17 of the Texas 
Constitution. However, because House Bill 3246’s intent does not match 
the statute in practice, any state interest would not be substantial enough to 
survive constitutional scrutiny. 
The strongest state interest, subtly outlined in the bill’s analysis, would 
incentivize operators to recycle water used during fracing operations.
168 
By 
incentivizing recycling, less virgin groundwater would be needed for 
extraction by operators.
169 
The legislature believed if operators were given 
statutory ownership of all post-fracing waste, including water, they would 
be more inclined, not only to recycle the waste water, but also to use it for 
further fracing operations. The state’s reasoning is flawed in the 
assumptions it relies on. So far, operators already have access to the 
necessary amount of fresh groundwater they need. Operators recycle 
wastewater to use it in future fracing operations, and the amount of 
freshwater operators extract will not decrease as a result of statutorily 
defined ownership.  
                                                                                                             
and gas beneath the soil are considered a part of the realty. Each owner of land owns 
separately, distinctly and exclusively all the oil and gas under his land and is accorded the 
usual remedies against trespassers who appropriate the minerals or destroy their market 
value). 
 167. See Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Tex. 2004) 
(explaining the scope by which courts will differentiate police powers and takings). 
 168. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246, 
86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (explaining that operators are less likely to recycle water if they 
cannot profit from it). 
 169. See Shale and Tight Resources, https://www.chevron.com/operations/shale (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2019) (describing how a large producer has taken advantage of water 
recycling technology in the fracing industry). 
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With the “grey area” solved by the legislature, operators have no reason 
to extract less fresh ground water. The legislature assumed operators were 
not recycling waste water because of the legal “grey area” of 
use/ownership.
170 
To some degree they were, and in those cases, operators 
preemptively entered into surface-use agreements or water-use agreements 




Further, with this legal “grey area” resolved, operators have no reason to 
use less fresh groundwater or use recycled wastewater in their current 
fracing operations, only to treat for a “beneficial use.”
172 
With these 
assumptions animating the intent of the statute, the practical reason for the 
operators to recycle waste water is because they are incentivized by House 
Bill 3246, and are far more likely to profit from cost savings from reuse, or 
the potential income derived from selling the water.
173
 
The statute’s change in wording, compared with the legal practicality it 
has produced, was advertised as making a molehill out of a mountain; 
changing the language was to clarify an ambiguity in the last stage of a 
multi-tiered operation separate from any legal obligations. This would be 
the case, if the operator already owned the water mountain. 
3. Proper Exercise of Police Power? 
The same case the Texas Supreme Court used to outline the vested 
property interest of groundwater begins with the surface estate, it also 
predicted future constitutional takings claims regarding groundwater: 
“Suppose a landowner were prohibited from all access to 
groundwater.*.*.*‘[G]iven that there is a property interest in groundwater, 
some manner and degree of groundwater regulation could, under some 
facts, effect a compensable taking of property.’.*.*.* [G]roundwater rights 
are property rights subject to constitutional protection.”
174
 
There is no question the power of the legislature to regulate all aspects of 
exploring and exploitation of natural resources; Texas has made great leaps 
in its history to protect water as a natural and finite resource.
175 
“All 
                                                                                                             
 170. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246, 
86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (explaining that operators are less likely to recycle water if they 
cannot profit from it). 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 833 (Tex. 2012) (describing 
the exact situation in which this comment seeks to shed light on). 
 175. See generally Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 835 (Tex. 2012) 
(outlining the way the legislature has historically regulated natural resources). 
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property is held subject to the valid exercise of the police power.”
176 
However, the Texas Supreme Court foreshadowed the issues addressed in 
this comment—allowing the operator to gain ownership through a state 
action deprives the surface owner “all access to [their] groundwater.”
177
 
Because the Texas Supreme Court has held groundwater rights of the 
surface estate are to be constitutionally protected analogous to oil and gas 
vested property interests, surface owners looking to challenge Texas 
Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.002 could rely on Edwards Aquifer 
Auth. v. Day, Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., Humble Oil & 
Refining Co. v. West, and current operator practices to prove the violation 
of Article I § 17 of the Texas Constitution. 
V. Conclusion 
Looking to evolve and innovate the common practice of post-fracing 
waste management, operators invested millions of dollars to recycle post-
fracing waste water for further use on the same tract of land, on a different 
tract of land, or for sale to other industries. By selling recycled water or by 
using it on other tracts of land, operators created an economy that not only 
reduces their operating costs, but can also be said to limit their 
environmental impact. Understanding the balance of rights Texas provides 
to both mineral and surface owners, operators looked to the Texas 
Legislature to codify this practice and solidify proprietary rights—at the 
expense of the surface owners. 
The real property doctrine of correlative rights creates a usufruct interest 
in the groundwater allowing the operator to use the water to exploit the 
minerals for benefit of the land or acreage pooled therewith. The statute 
then attempts to expand the usufruct right of use into an ownership interest 
in the backflow water. Other states will likely look to House Bill 3246 as a 
guide to codifying post-fracing recycled waste. With that being said, 
caution must be taken. Correlative rights permeate through American 
common law like the hydrocarbons located in fraced fissures, legislatures 
must take care to account for them in future legislation. 
                                                                                                             
 176. See Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Tex. 2004) 
(explaining the scope of police powers that have been allowable by the Texas Legislature). 
 177. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 835 (Tex. 2012) 
(understanding the ownership aspects of groundwater by surface owners). 
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